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Taliban Perspectives on Reconciliation
Abstract
With the Western military draw-down in Afghanistan drawing closer, attention now turns to the shape of the
post-2014 political settlement. Some form of accommodation with the Taliban will be required for a stable
and secure Afghanistan. This paper presents the findings of discussions with senior Taliban figures, suggesting
that the Taliban and the international community may in fact have reconcilable positions. This paper works to
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Taliban Perspectives on Reconciliation
Michael Semple, Theo Farrell, Anatol Lieven and Rudra Chaudhuri
Royal United Services Institute  September 2012
Briefing PaPer
In July 2012, the authors of this report interviewed four senior Taliban 
interlocutors about the Taliban’s approach to reconciliation. The primary 
objective was to draw them out on three key issues: 
1. International terrorism and the Taliban’s links with Al-Qa’ida and 
other armed non-state actors
2. The potential for a ceasefire 
3. Parameters for conflict resolution and continuing presence of US 
military bases.
The interlocutors we interviewed referred mainly to the so-called Quetta 
Shura Taliban led by Mullah Mohammad Omar. This is, as they all confirmed, 
the primary vehicle driving the insurgency, and, in their view, continues to 
enjoy the allegiance of other key groups dotting the insurgent landscape. 
The unwavering consensus amongst our interviewees was that for an 
agreement to hold, it would ultimately require approval by Mullah Mohammad 
Omar. Therefore, our focus was trained mainly on the Quetta Shura and its 
leadership structure. The use of the term ‘Taliban’ in this report refers to the 
Quetta Shura. Further, our assessment is that the interlocutors we spoke to 
present the views of the moderate wing of the Taliban leadership, centred 
on the Political Commission. We have less confidence in the extent to which 
these views may be attributed to the more hard-line section of the Taliban 
centred on the Military Commission.   
The Interviews and the Interviewees
The interviewees spoke to us on terms of anonymity; while we present a 
short background on each, they are each referred to by letter. Further, their 
backgrounds and designations have been confirmed and cross-checked by 
the authors in our individual capacity. Interviews were conducted separately 
with each of our candidates. They lasted between three and five hours, and 
were conducted in Pashto, Farsi and Urdu. For three of the four interviews, at 
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least two interviewers spoke one of these languages, serving to cross-check 
the translation. The interviewees were:
Interviewee A: A former Taliban minister familiar with the workings of the 
Quetta Shura’s Political Committee, and who has been closely associated 
with Mullah Mohammad Omar. 
Interviewee B: A former Taliban deputy minister and a founding member 
of the Taliban. B was part of the group that pushed its way into Kandahar 
in the early 1990s. As expected, B provided the most insight into the 
structure and debates inside the Taliban movement. He also made clear 
that he was choosing his words carefully to represent, as far as possible, 
the general and genuine views of the movement in response to our 
questions.  
Interviewee C: A senior former mujahedeen commander and lead 
negotiator for the Taliban. C has never been part of the Taliban, but fought 
with and even led a number of key Taliban leaders throughout the 1980s. 
Notably, C negotiated key deals between the Taliban and other non-
Taliban groups in the 1990s. C also provided the most critical perspective 
of the Taliban having actually experienced negotiating with and for them. 
Interviewee D: An Afghan mediator with extensive experience negotiating 
with the Taliban as recently as the late 2000s. D has never officially been 
part of the Taliban. 
For the sake of methodological clarity, we developed a three-pronged 
approach to the interviews. First, interviewees were asked to provide a 
somewhat lengthy introduction to themselves as well as their association with 
the Taliban. Second, we asked questions on and around the three substantive 
issues outlined at the start of the briefing. Third, and as a control mechanism, 
we sought to cross-check one interviewee’s perspectives with the other. 
This briefing studiously avoids placing the authors’ biases, views, and 
opinions into the main of the text. We focus more on what our interviewees 
had to say. Only in the introduction to each of the three sections discussed 
below do we establish the context that informed our line of questioning. The 
key findings are highlighted below, followed by more detailed analysis.




• The Taliban leadership and base deeply regret their past association 
with Al-Qa’ida. Once a general ceasefire and/or political agreement 
are decided, the base would obey a call by Mullah Mohammad Omar 
– and only him – to completely renounce Al-Qa’ida
• Renunciation would need to be built into a larger agreement, allowing 
the Taliban to leverage their delinking themselves – step by step – 
from Al-Qa’ida in exchange for some form of political recognition
• Following renunciation, the Taliban would act to assure that Al-Qa’ida 
is no longer able to operate on Afghan soil
• The Taliban are open to setting-up a Joint Monitoring Commission 
staffed by Taliban representatives, ISAF and the Afghan Government 
to investigate reports of continued Al-Qa’ida activity
• Continuation of drone attacks both within Afghanistan and across the 
border in Pakistan would severely complicate the task of maintaining 
the base’s allegiance and the leadership’s ability to control popular 
outrage. 
Ceasefire 
• The Taliban would be open to negotiating a ceasefire as part of a 
general settlement, and also as a bridge between confidence-building 
measures and the core issue of the distribution of political power in 
Afghanistan
• A ceasefire would require strong Islamic justification, obscuring any 
hint of surrender
• A ceasefire endorsed by Mullah Mohammad Omar has the greatest 
potential for success
• A general ceasefire (closer to a larger plan for reconciliation) is 
preferred by the Taliban more than local- and district-level ceasefires 
(reintegrating local commanders and cadres). A general ceasefire 
with Mullah Mohammad Omar’s backing would allow the Taliban to 
better deal with ‘peace spoilers’ and dissenters. 
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Parameters for Conflict Resolution and US Military Bases
• The Taliban will not negotiate with President Karzai or his 
administration, which is seen as corrupt and weak
• Outright acceptance of the present Afghan constitution is widely 
considered as a non-starter. The substance of the constitution is less 
a matter of dispute, and can be negotiated. The leadership perceive 
that acceptance would be tantamount to surrender
• The Taliban are willing to accept long-term US military presence and 
bases as long as they do not constrain Afghan independence and 
Islamic jurisprudence. In time, military presence could be transformed 
into mainly economic assistance
• The Taliban leadership are keen to end all attacks on teachers and 
health-care workers, as evident in public statements
• Modern subjects such as mathematics and sciences are encouraged in 
both madrasas and schools more generally, as underlined in a Taliban 
policy document on education circulated in early 2012
• The Taliban fully understand that their policies of the 1990s need to 
be re-configured in the face of rapidly changing social forces within 
current-day Afghanistan
• Co-education will not be tolerated, but models for both education 
and working environments could be adapted to accommodate strict 
segregation of men and women. 




The Taliban have consistently and at different times argued that they are 
willing to disassociate themselves from international terrorist groups like Al-
Qa’ida. Yet, and for the most part, there is little clarity as to how this may 
happen. We therefore focused our questions on what it would actually take 
for the Taliban to completely delink themselves from Al-Qa’ida and other 
non-state and armed groups.
Renunciation is a ‘Given’
Renouncing international terrorism and the likes of Al-Qa’ida was considered 
‘a given’ by interviewees A and B. The question, B stressed, is not whether the 
Taliban will delink itself from Al-Qa’ida, but rather the process by which this 
could be done. The Taliban is not, as B made plain, part of the government 
in Kabul. Hence, he stressed, ‘How could it enforce action without the right 
authority?’ Indeed, all four interviewees agreed that renunciation was 
a process – and not an end in itself – that would need to be built into a 
comprehensive peace settlement.
The speakers emphasised that the Taliban and Al-Qa’ida had quite different 
origins and different Sunni theologies (the Taliban belonging to the Deobandi 
school of South Asia, while Al-Qa’ida are Wahabis, which originates in Saudi 
Arabia), and that Osama bin Laden was originally invited to Afghanistan not 
by the Taliban, but by members of the mujahedeen regime whom the Taliban 
displaced from power. They all stated, in different words, that the Taliban 
now recognise that their links to Al-Qa’ida before 9/11 were a mistake. As 
Box 1: Insurgency Leadership
The main Taliban leadership structure is often referred to as the ‘Quetta Shura’, 
even though few of its members are located in Quetta any more; this group is 
made up of older-generation leaders from southern Afghanistan who were alive 
during the war in the 1980s and participated in the Taliban-led government 
during the late 1990s. Mullah Mohammad Omar is the leader of this group, 
although his presence and activities have been hidden since 2001. The Haqqanis 
– commonly referred to as ‘the Haqqani network’, although this is an American 
neologism – are a group based in southeast Afghanistan and follow patriarch 
Jalaluddin Haqqani and increasingly his son, Serajuddin. The Haqqanis have 
pledged their allegiance to the ‘Quetta’ Taliban leadership and take pains to 
restate this publicly, although there are divisions between the two. Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar heads up yet another organisation, Hizb-i Islami, and he has done so 
since the 1980s when he led the party as one of the most prominent mujahedeen 
leaders; Hizb-i Islami (also known as HiG) has been engaged in negotiations with 
the Afghan government for several years.
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the former Taliban deputy minister and founding member told us, ‘We hold 
Al-Qa’ida responsible for wrecking our work to create an Islamic state in 
Afghanistan.’ According to D, the Taliban are ‘100 per cent’ convinced that 
‘Al-Qa’ida were behind 9/11.’ He argued that the leadership was unaware of 
the plans when they were hatched on Afghan soil.
B argued that there is a widespread belief amongst field commanders and 
at least the Political Commission of the Quetta Shura that ‘Al-Qa’ida was 
responsible for their ouster’, and that this consequently interrupted ‘the 
implementation of Sharia within Afghanistan.’ In the ultimate analysis, the 
base would accept the leadership’s call to isolate and eject Al-Qa’ida as long 
as the decision came directly from Mullah Mohammad Omar.
Dealing with Peace Spoilers
As expected, B was far more optimistic about the Taliban leadership’s ability 
to control and deal with potential peace spoilers than C or D. He argued that 
the current jihad forced ‘international jihadis’ and Pakistani-based groups 
like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) to ‘co-operate.’ Once a settlement was in sight, ‘the 
Taliban would spread the word not to host international terrorists.’ Following 
an agreement with ISAF and the Afghan government, dissenters would 
be ‘sought out’ and ‘dealt with.’ B suggested that the idea of instituting 
a joint commission staffed by those chosen by the Taliban, ISAF and the 
Afghan Government was not wholly unrealistic. Members of the Political 
Commission within the Quetta Shura could be persuaded to agree to this if a 
final agreement were indeed in sight.
A joint commission could then deal with the Haqqanis, which, although 
closer to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), ‘do not 
have the capacity to stand-up to the combined strength of the Quetta Shura.’ 
B also dismissed rumours that Qayum Zakir, responsible for military affairs 
within the Quetta Shura, had fundamental differences with the Political 
Commission. Zakir, B made sure to underline, is still Mullah Mohammad 
Omar’s deputy, and would ‘fall in line’. In short, B suggested, ‘we think 
of Zakir as Nick Clegg’; challenging a coalition from within, but only to a 
certain tolerable extent.
As far as C and D were concerned, controlling groups like the Haqqanis 
would be far more difficult than current and former Taliban leaders 
(such as B) presume. D made clear that in the case of the Haqqanis, a lot 
would depend on how Pakistan and specifically the ISI played their cards. 
Operationalising a delinking strategy would hence depend on the extent to 
which Pakistan was invested in a potential peace process. Further, Haqqani 
opposition would in turn give Pakistani intelligence an opportunity to 
undermine the entire peace process if it wanted. Needless to add, whilst B 
forcefully pushed the idea that the leadership could succeed in delinking 
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the Taliban from Al-Qa’ida, the ability to shape the Haqqanis’ strategic 
future remained hazy at best.
Drones as Instruments of Counter-Terrorism
All our interviewees said that agreeing to the continuation of drone 
attacks would be extremely difficult for the Taliban, even if remaining Al-
Qa’ida figures were identified. Tacit Taliban agreement to continued drone 
strikes in Pakistan from Afghan bases would cause outrage in the Pakistani 
establishment, among Pakistani Islamists and in the Haqqanis. Above all, 
such an agreement would be seen by fellow-Pashtuns in Pakistan as deeply 
dishonourable.
Interestingly, whilst B argued that even the ‘idea of discussing drones was 
a long way away’, this should not necessarily be considered a deal breaker. 
He also stressed that condemning drone attacks should in no way be read in 
terms of ‘defending Al-Qa’ida.’ The issue had to do with ‘dealing with popular 
discontent’ and the risk to ‘Afghan independence.’ Inside Afghanistan, B 
stated, each and every drone attack would need to be carefully ‘discussed 
and negotiated.’ Across Afghanistan’s borders, ‘international rules should 
apply to the use of drones as instruments of military force.’ Ideally, instead 
of using drones, as B and D argued, ISAF and the Taliban could use the joint 
commission to deal with spoilers and international jihadis. To be sure, such a 
commission could also develop enforcement actions against spoilers.
Renunciation: The Way Forward
As has been made plain, renunciation in itself is not a problem. However, 
getting the Taliban to actively and more persistently renounce Al-Qa’ida 
and international jihadis will require some form of political agreement. This 
need not mean a comprehensive plan inked by 2014, the point by which 
international forces are expected to have withdrawn the bulk of their 
combat troops, but rather a process that allows the Taliban to ‘use’, as D put 
it, renunciation as a lever to ‘negotiate something substantial.’
According to B, a three-step process might be considered. First, a ceasefire 
needs to be put in place in the near future. In turn, and second, this would 
allow the Taliban leadership the diplomatic cover to engage both Afghan 
representatives in Kabul and ISAF with the view to institutionalising a joint 
commission. Third, complete renunciation and even enforcement measures 
be put in place as a potential ceasefire matures into something longer lasting 
like a political agreement. In essence, as B underlined, ‘the Taliban can really 
push through promises and renounce more and more once negotiations gain 
steam.’




The Afghan government and its international allies have officially supported 
programmes of reintegration and reconciliation for at least seven years. 
Increasingly, these efforts have been based on the anticipation that conflict 
resolution will eventually require a political agreement with insurgents. 
However, at no stage has any major protagonist proposed a general 
ceasefire or even publicly addressed the issue of proper sequencing of 
moves towards a ceasefire. This section, as informed by our interviews, 
challenges the lazy assumption that generalised conflict must continue 
until a political agreement. It indicates the issues which will have to be 
addressed for an early ceasefire to become a viable component of peace 
efforts.
Ceasefire as a Prologue to an Agreement
No Taliban leader has publicly endorsed the idea of a ceasefire. However, 
the interviewees considered it plausible that the Taliban would support a 
ceasefire in the right circumstances. Indeed, being open to a ceasefire is a 
logical corollary of accepting that outright military victory is unobtainable. 
Interview D argued that the Taliban recognised that the movement had the 
support of about one third of the population. The leadership, according 
to D, was convinced that outright military victory was out of the question. 
This of course does not mean that some members within the movement 
– read the Military Commission – would not want to fight for victory. But, 
by and large, a ceasefire as the first step towards a settlement would have 
traction amongst the majority of the Political Committee and even Mullah 
Mohammad Omar.
The Taliban’s public line continues to suggest that they will ‘defeat the 
foreigners’ but, according to C and D, they do not believe it. Instead, 
they acknowledge that generating military power is simply not enough. 
The ability to garner economic power and increase public support are 
imperatives they recognise, but have limited control or influence over. 
The leadership understands that it does not have ‘holding capacity’ – the 
ability to hold ground and wield military power over a long period. The 
base, however, according to D, continues to think that ‘political power is 
possible.’ To convince the base, therefore, the issue of a ceasefire will have 
to be carefully handled.
For the moment, discussions around a ceasefire, which in itself may serve as 
a substantive confidence-building measure given the requirement of each 
party to meet and interact, would need to be delinked from the publicly 
stated pre-conditions – as articulated by the Afghan government and ISAF 
– of laying down arms, disassociating with Al-Qa’ida, and accepting the 
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Afghan constitution as is. These would need to be incrementally negotiated. 
Indeed, to appeal to the Taliban base, a ceasefire scheme would have to 
incorporate a strong Islamic justification, be represented as a voluntary act 
of the Taliban, avoid the appearance of surrender and be tied clearly to 
opportunities to address practical Taliban concerns and grievances. In this, 
as D suggested, a ceasefire could be considered as the bridge between 
confidence-building measures and the substantive issues in resolving the 
Afghan conflict.
Choreographing a Ceasefire
There is a range of options regarding who would initiate a ceasefire and 
which parties it would cover. On the insurgent side, a general ceasefire 
could be ordered by the top leadership, by local commanders further 
down the hierarchy or by a faction within the movement – a forward bloc. 
Participants considered that a ceasefire endorsed by Mullah Mohammad 
Omar would have the greatest chance of success. Failure to co-operate 
with such a ceasefire would amount to rebellion against the authority that 
all Taliban recognise.
For this reason, B and D argued that a general ceasefire would be preferable 
to local efforts. B argued that the ‘problem with local ceasefires is that it 
cuts off the leadership.’ Moreover, even if the chances of a general ceasefire 
are bleak, it would be valuable to invest in the process. B argued that if the 
top leadership were involved, and if some form of ceasefire proposal was 
agreed, ‘an order from the top would be implemented immediately.’ Mullah 
Mohammad Omar’s word, according to B, ‘is still accepted 110 per cent.’ 
If a general agreement was not reached, Mullah Mohammad Omar would 
back away from lending his name, taking with him a moral commitment 
needed to convince the base.
To be sure, whether or not Mullah Mohammad Omar would back ceasefire 
negotiations – as opposed to endorsing a final agreement – was disputed. 
Interviewee A in fact argued that Mullah Mohammad Omar could well be 
an obstacle to achieving a ceasefire. However, as A made clear, this should 
not distract a forward bloc from negotiating the same without Mullah 
Mohammad Omar’s approval. The idea, in this case and according to A, 
would be to essentially hustle Mullah Mohammad Omar into endorsing a 
ceasefire that has been negotiated outside of his authority.
According to C, and apart from the fact that Mullah Mohammad Omar 
may not immediately endorse ceasefire negotiations that may take effect 
anytime soon, the reality is that he and the Taliban leadership based in 
Pakistan would not be able to be a part of these negotiations. C argued 
that extricating the Taliban leadership from Pakistan, and cutting their 
relationship with sponsors there, may be necessary in order to put them 
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in a position to endorse a ceasefire. The main conclusion to be drawn from 
this discussion is that once a general ceasefire is on the agenda, there is a 
range of options as to who will advocate it and who will become a party to 
it. Even if a comprehensive ceasefire is initially unattainable, an incremental 
approach may serve to build up support.
C also pointed to his experience of dealing with Taliban ceasefire negotiations 
in the 1990s. This experience highlighted the importance of efforts to 
ensure that the top leadership was publicly invested in any ceasefire. C 
was witness in the 1990s to a number of agreements ‘made and broken’ 
by the Taliban with the likes of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Ismail Khan. 
However, in C’s view, ‘it is possible that the Taliban has changed.’ Given the 
fact that American forces are on Afghan soil, and that the opposition to the 
Taliban is formidable, ‘it is not un-hopeful that the Taliban will negotiate 
and honour an agreement signed by Mullah Mohammad Omar.’
However, as a cautionary note, C underlined that getting the Taliban to 
both enter and abide by a ceasefire agreement would need ‘sustained 
engagement to keep them in a negotiated mode.’ As for B, this process 
could only really begin as and when the Afghan government and ISAF agree 
to ‘protect the leadership.’ After all, he argued, the government would need 
working partners led from the ‘top-down’ rather than ‘the bottom-up.’
Parameters for Conflict Resolution
Context
Following the discussions around the potential for a ceasefire and renouncing 
terrorism, we explored the latent parameters for conflict termination. Here, 
we tested the extent to which the publicly declared statements about 
rejecting the constitution and American military presence holds true. Overall, 
we found that the interviewees projected a far more pragmatic picture 
of the Taliban than otherwise believed. Further, the Taliban’s approach to 
education and health also demonstrated a degree of revision and pragmatism 
in sync – to an extent – with international priorities and those of the Afghan 
government. In this context, there were some positive indications that the 
Taliban have amended policies which worked to the detriment of education 
and health during the 1990s.
Afghan Constitution
All four interviewees made clear that there was no buy-in whatsoever for 
accepting the Afghan constitution as it is currently lettered and represented: 
a document that is widely seen by the base as lending authority to the 
present Karzai regime. However, both B and D argued that this issue could 
be dealt with if the narrative around acceptance – presently seen as one akin 
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to surrender – is changed, and if the constitution were to be approved by a 
Loya Jirga or an assembly of sorts with representation from the Taliban.
Importantly, D underlined, the Taliban more or less agreed with the substance 
of the constitution, which is premised on Islamic jurisprudence. The problem 
for the leadership is one of perception. C also agreed that ‘there is nothing 
in the constitution that the Taliban actually oppose’; it is more a matter of 
‘interpretation.’
In short, a solution would need to be found by which accepting the 
constitution would not in any way hint at surrender.
Parliament, Elections and ‘Partners’
Interviewee B stated that the Taliban have no problem with the idea of 
parliament or elections. What they may want, if and when an agreement is 
negotiated and primarily to satisfy the base, is some form of clerical role in 
Afghan government, but without executive authority. Further, the Taliban 
would want a centralised and undivided state, and would oppose a federal 
structure.
With regards to forming a post-conflict government, B argued that the Taliban 
felt ‘there was no real foundation for elections in Afghanistan.’ President 
Karzai was ‘utterly corrupt’, and could not be relied upon to deliver ‘clean 
elections.’ Interviewee A also underlined that ‘the Taliban cannot support a 
government run by Karzai.’ If an agreement was to be reached, B suggested 
that an interim period of three years – he specifically mentioned three years 
– would be needed between a nominal agreement and elections, which 
Taliban representatives would campaign like any other candidates.
According to C, this need not mean ‘bringing in’ hardcore elements of the 
Taliban currently based in Pakistan, but endorsing ‘peaceful and moderate’ 
Taliban that would silence the radical wing, whilst being acceptable to the 
international community and the Tajik minority. In C’s personal view, Mullah 
Abdul Salam Zaeef (the former Taliban ambassador to Pakistan) and Mullah 
Mutawakkil (the former Taliban foreign minister) would be acceptable to 
members of the Political Committee. A argued that these could simply be 
men who ‘enjoy prestige’, ‘our people of standing’, and need not necessarily 
hail from within the movement. Ideally, A made clear, the Taliban would 
want one vice president and five cabinet ministers
Given that the Taliban would at best serve as minority representatives, 
B and C were clear that they would have to work with other members of 
parliament. However, ‘there was no chance’ of associating with those who 
had a proven record of corruption. Looking forward to the 2014 elections, the 
Taliban, according to C, would not accept any member of the Karzai family, 
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including Quayum Karzai. Interviewee B emphasised that a key imperative 
for the Taliban in government would be to root out corruption. Hence, as B 
put it, the question is not ‘who the Taliban will work with’, but ‘who is willing 
and able to work with the Taliban.’
According to D, those around Karzai and far removed from his family would 
be acceptable to the Taliban. In the ‘last few months’, D maintained, ‘there 
have been some positive movements towards peace, and there is visible 
buy-in from the Taliban’; ‘consensus figures exist.’ Salahuddin Rabani, the 
son of the late Burhanuddin Rabani, and current head of the High Peace 
Council (HPC) would be one such actor. Importantly, A disagreed with this. 
In the view of this former minister, Rabani and the HCP could not be taken 
seriously in its current form. However, there are others who could deliver 
peace. A suggested that the Taliban were open to working with opposition 
groups,, and specifically with Ahmed Zia Massoud, the younger brother of 
Ahmed Shah Massoud.
Further, if returned to power, A and B firmly argued that the Taliban would 
focus more on bureaucratic professionalism and less on matters of piety. D 
captured a view prevailing among all interviewees that the Taliban leadership 
do have a vision of peace, but that has ‘nothing to do with the US vision’, 
– this is ‘one centred on recognising the constitution.’ Rather, it revolves 
around ‘correcting the mistakes of the previous political rule and remaining 
engaged with the international community.’ This, however, as C made clear, 
would require constant vigilance and monitoring. Given a little space, the 
Taliban may well be tempted to advance the views and practices of the more 
radical wing of the Quetta Shura.
US Military Bases
The Taliban are prepared to accept a long-term US military presence in 
Afghanistan. B provided the greatest insight. The guiding principle, according 
to him, was that US military bases and continuing presence of soldiers would 
be acceptable to a level ‘that does not impinge on our independence and 
religion.’ When pushed, B suggested that the prospect of the US military 
operating in Afghanistan up to 2024 and out of five primary military bases 
– Kandahar, Herat, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul – could be agreed 
‘through negotiation.’ However, the Taliban would need to consider this in 
the context of what is best for Afghan national security.
The US’s presence would be acceptable if it contributed to Afghan security, 
but not if the Americans launch attacks against neighbours – such as Iran and 
Pakistan – from Afghanistan. B went on to say that this did not mean that 
the Taliban wanted to shield either Iran or Pakistan, but that it would impact 
their national security and invite ‘trouble.’ If the Americans wanted to attack 
Iran, B continued, they could do so from somewhere in the Persian Gulf.
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Interviewees A, B and C could foresee a long-term US role in Afghanistan. All 
three said that the Taliban would accept this, provided it served the interests 
of Afghanistan. B stressed that there was and is no natural enmity between 
the Taliban and the Americans. He claimed that the Taliban originally looked 
for advice from the Americans (citing experience from three international 
conferences in the late 1990s), and on all occasions Taliban advances were 
spurned. C offered the view that a core concern for the Taliban in any future 
government is to avoid the country fragmenting, and in this context the 
Taliban would need US assistance in order to hold the Afghan National Army 
together. C also noted the Taliban’s concern on Iran (echoing B’s sentiments), 
and in this regard continued US military presence could serve Afghan national 
security. A also clearly saw a long-term role for America, but suggested 
that this should transition from the current focus on military assistance to 
economic assistance.
Schools, Teachers and Healthcare
From the outset, B made clear to assert that the Taliban should ‘not be 
considered as anti-education.’ Attacks against schools and teachers have 
significantly decreased following several iterations of explicit orders from the 
senior leadership. The same holds for healthcare, where the polio campaign 
has benefited from letters of support from Mullah Mohammad Omar, to cite 
just one example.
A new six-page policy on education was circulated earlier this year, moreover, 
which appears to be a serious attempt to outline the current official stance 
on education. It takes it as a given that education is a necessity. It states: 
‘understanding the sacred Islamic disciplines and modern educational 
concepts are greatly needed.’ It allows for considerable flexibility in terms 
of different levels of education; rural communities accustomed to religious 
education have access, but urban communities also have their needs provided 
for. In many ways, it is a description that fits with the current educational 
activities of the Afghan government.
It also allows for the presence of ‘contemporary subjects, such as science, 
chemistry, physics, biology, mathematics, geography, history.’ The policy does 
not envision starting from scratch, but rather seeks to reform from within, 
noting that schools that already are operating should ‘not be closed [but] 
controlled and supervised.’ Even on education for girls and young women, 
the policy offers relative flexibility, albeit with some vagueness regarding 
post-pubescent girls. The document is addressed to the West as well as 
to the Taliban’s own constitution, trying to walk the slim line between not 
alienating the more conservative parts of the movement and pushing too 
much onto them, while showing significant movement and coherence with 
current policy of the Afghan government and its Western allies.
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Other senior-level statements issued in recent months unambiguously 
reflect and endorse this new policy. Attacks against education and health 
are subject to sanction from the leadership if fighters are caught doing so. 
Indeed, B made plain that apart from the fact that the Taliban have learnt 
from their mistakes in the past – when its stance on education and curricula 
was anything but flexible – the leadership also realises that supporting 
education is a genuine ‘counter-propaganda’ tool. The truth is, he argued, 
‘people want modern education.’ However, B underlined that ‘the Taliban 
would never agree to co-education.’ In essence, the approach to schooling 
would need to be negotiated.
With the view to demonstrate their eagerness to promote education, B stated 
that, in areas where the Taliban retain a strong presence, their commanders 
have been asked to encourage students to apply for and take the concord 
examination for university entrance. ‘Our policy’, he noted, ‘allows for the 
killing of government officials but not teachers.’ Further, he argued that the 
Taliban had ‘given permission to national and international NGOs to work on 
healthcare projects.’
C offered a broader perspective, and the suggestion that the problems with 
education and healthcare provision were not purely those relating to the 
Taliban. An example was given of a district in northern Afghanistan where the 
Taliban had taken over a school as a base, but where the local government 
representative had also done so. Issues relating to the salaries of teachers 
and health workers, and corruption, he said, were the real problems where 
reform was needed.
Following our interviews, we also contacted Zabiullah Mujahed, one of 
the senior spokesmen of the Taliban, to confirm the movement’s official 
approach to education and health. He made the following statement:
You know well that these two [government] ministries are working for 
the people to make educational and health facilities for the people. We 
want to help both of these things too, so we are trying to make good 
facilities and a calm and secure environment for the general population of 
Afghanistan to be able to have access to education and health.
Interviewees offered few specifics for moving forward on health and 
education beyond continuing to support the moves that had already been 
taken by the Taliban, and perhaps finding a way to build them in as part of 
the Qatar process.
The interviewees offered the suggestion that education and perhaps 
healthcare were relatively neutral issues that could be built into the Qatar 
process, perhaps even as confidence-building measures.
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